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D Microeconomics 
Analytical Politics. By Melvin J. Hinich and 
Michael C. Munger. Cambridge; New York, 
and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 
1997. Pp. xii, 253. $59.95, cloth; $21.95, pbk. 
ISBN 0-521-56287-2, cloth; 0-521-56567-7, 
pbk. ]EL 98-0065 
Mathematical models of political processes 
have become increasingly sophisticated over 
the last few decades, with the lessons drawn 
from such models generating insights rele-
vant for both political scientists and econo-
mists. In Analytical Politics, Professors 
Hinich and Munger present some of the pri-
mary building blocks of these models, show 
how they fit together, and describe some of 
the more fundamental conclusions estab-
lished to date. The material is pitched to an 
audience of graduate and advanced under-
graduate students in political science and 
economics (exercises are provided), as well as 
to scholars unfamiliar with the terrain. Most 
of the formal results are stated without proof, 
and no new results are presented. 
The book begins with a fairly detailed look 
at the basic spatial model of politics: a set of 
policies equal to d-dimensional Euclidean 
space, and a set of n individuals each in pos-
session of a well-behaved utility function over 
policies. The two principal questions with 
which the theory is concerned are (1) When 
is the set of majority rule core policies (i.e., 
those against which no other policy can com-
mand a majority) non-empty? and (2) Where 
is this set located in the policy space? An-
swers to these questions are relevant for col-
lective policymaking "in the small" where the 
n individuals constitute a committee that 
must directly decide on a policy, as well as "in 
the large" where candidates or parties pro-
pose policies subsequently voted on by the 
individuals: under certain additional assump-
tions core policies constitute equilibrium out-
comes of both processes. 
As the authors demonstrate in chapters 2 
and 3, the answer to (1) depends critically on 
d, the number of dimensions in the policy 
space: if d equals 1 a majority rule core point 
exists, whereas when d is at least 2 such 
points can, and oftentimes do, fail to exist. In 
contrast, the answer to (2) is independent of 
d, and reduces to the familiar Median Voter 
Theorem when d happens to equal 1. In par-
ticular, the core is located in the "center" (in 
a certain sense) of the distribution of voters' 
ideal policies, and so "the center is the focus 
of political power" (p. 133). Yet the absence of 
such a "center" in multidimensional models is 
viewed as a serious impediment to collective 
decision making, especially in conjunction 
with the Chaos Theorem (presented some-
what unfortunately only in chapter 8) which 
states that without a core one can get from 
any policy to any other (and back again) via 
the majority preference relation. Hence the 
authors' pessimistic conclusion: in two or 
more dimensions "there is not necessarily a 
'middle' that we can depend on to lend stabil-
ity to democracy: majority rule processes can 
be arbitrary" (p. 63). In this judgment the 
authors are certainly in the majority, as can 
be seen by the subsequent "structure-induced 
equilibrium" research which rationalizes vari-
ous political institutions (e.g. legislative com-
mittees) as the barricades holding back the 
otherwise inevitable onslaught of chaos. 
An alternative perspective, though, is that 
these core nonexistence and chaos theorems 
do not predict (as it is commonly phrased) 
"anything can happen"; as nonequilibrium re-
sults they do not predict anything at all. 
Rather, what these negative results demon-
strate is the impossibility of any general the-
ory of political behavior based solely on the 
notion of preference aggregation under ma-
jority rule, and therefore the necessity of 
additional structure in order to have a well-
posed equilibrium model. From this perspec-
tive, then, the lesson to be learned is one for 
the modeler of political processes, rather than 
one about the political processes themselves. 
After presenting some technical support 
for the multidimensional model in chapter 4, 
chapter 5 presents Arrow's Impossibility 
Theorem as the answer to the question, 
"What about other methods of prefer,ence ag-
gregation?" The negative conclusion here, 
that any method must fail to satisfy at least 
one otherwise desirable criterion, implies 
that the "bad" features of majority rule found 
in the earlier chapters show up in various dis-
guises for any other method as well and so 
should be viewed as merely an example of the 
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inherent weaknesses in any collective choice 
process. This chapter requires a technical 
shift away from the spatial model and into a 
finite-policy world, which may cause confu-
sion for the reader at a few junctures. For 
instance, the Condorcet paradox requires 
preferences to be non-single-peaked, and yet 
in the spatial model it was shown that a ma-
jority rule core could fail to exist in two di-
mensions "even assuming preferences are 
separable and single-peaked" (pp. 62-63) (i.e., 
single-peaked along each dimension). Hence 
the relation between single-peakedness in the 
finite and spatial model, and their relevance 
for the existence of majority rule core points, 
may be somewhat opaque. 
Similarly, the authors could have stayed 
within the spatial framework and stated, in-
stead of Arrow, nonexistence results for a 
broad class of aggregation rules (cf, N. 
Schofield "Social Equilibrium and Cycles on 
Compact Sets," Journal of Economic Theory 
(1984) 33:59-71). Indeed, since the authors 
examine in some detail the properties of 
supermajority or q-rules as alternatives to 
majority rule, they missed an opportunity to 
show how cleanly the parameters q and d get 
translated into determining when the core of 
a q-rule will be non-empty and how the above 
results for majority rule drop out as a special 
case. Admittedly, however, Arrow's Theorem 
is an irresistible and well-known target, and 
so not including it would have surely imposed 
a different but no-less-substantial cost. 
The next two chapters consider various ex-
tensions of the basic model. Chapter 6 takes 
the electoral (as opposed to committee) per-
spective and allows for candidate uncertainty 
over voter preferences, voter uncertainty over 
candidate positions, and candidates with pol-
icy preferences. All of this is accomplished in 
the one-dimensional model, and so at issue is 
the convergence of candidate policies toward 
the "center," with the conclusion being that 
such convergence is fairly robust. Chapter 7 
looks at the incentives of voters to abstain 
from voting (due to costs, indifference, etc.), 
with one of the main results being that as n 
gets arbitrarily large, the equilibrium number 
of individuals who vote tends to zero. 
Finally, the last two chapters provide a 
brief tour of some recent advances, where in 
contrast to the two previous chapters these 
are not presented as "add-ons" to the basic 
theory but rather as more substantial 
changes. Chapter 8 looks at the possibility of 
strategic voting and states the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite Theorem (both in the finite 
world), examines the effects of nonseparable 
preferences on agenda manipulation in the 
multidimensional model, and presents the 
probabilistic model of voter behavior. Chap-
ter 9 describes a "directional" theory of 
voting, as well as the authors' own ideology-
based theory. 
Professors Hinich and Munger are to be 
commended for presenting at a not-too-tech-
nical level many of the key insights and quan-
daries underlying much of what is formal po-
litical theory. Further, the use of numerous 
verbal and visual examples of the concepts 
and conclusions helps to sustain a desirable 
level of reader friendliness. Upon absorbing 
the book's message students and others will 
no doubt be inspired to delve deeper into 
these sometimes murky theoretical waters. 
JEFFREYS. BANKS 
California Institute of Technology 
Parental Priorities and Economic Inequality. By 
Casey B. Mulligan. Chicago and London: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1997. Pp. xvi, 377. 
$60.00, cloth; $24.95, pbk. ISBN 0-226-
54839-2, cloth; 0-226-54840--6, pbk. 
]EL 98--0862 
The intergenerational transmission of eco-
nomic status within families affects the evolu-
tion of economic inequalities and the ways in 
which governmental policies might alter the 
extent of inequalities. Both descriptive and 
policy questions relate to this process. Will 
African Americans ever be as rich as Euro-
pean Americans? If so, how soon? What are 
the effects of educational, inheritance, and 
other tax policies and welfare programs on 
the intergenerational transmission of eco-
nomic status? 
A theory of the role of families in the inter-
generational transmission of inequalities is 
necessary to guide empirical interpretations 
related to such questions. This interesting 
and provocative book addresses this topic, 
with arguments organized into four parts, 
